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Abstract. Protocols in distributed settings usually rely on the interaction of several parties and often identify
the roles involved in communications. Roles may have a behavioral interpretation, as they do not necessarily
correspond to sites or physical devices. Notions of role authorization thus become necessary to consider settings
in which, e.g., different sites may be authorized to act on behalf of a single role, or in which one site may be
authorized to act on behalf of different roles. This flexibility must be equipped with ways of controlling the roles
that the different parties are authorized to represent, including the challenging case in which role authorizations
are determined only at runtime. We present a typed framework for the analysis of multiparty interaction with
dynamic role authorizationanddelegation.Buildingonpreviousworkonconversation typeswith role assignment,
our formal model is based on an extension of the π -calculus in which the basic resources are pairs channel-role,
which denote the access right of interacting along a given channel representing the given role. To specify dynamic
authorization control, our process model includes (1) a novel scoping construct for authorization domains, and
(2) communication primitives for authorizations, which allow to pass around authorizations to act on a given
channel. An authorization error then corresponds to an action involving a channel and a role not enclosed by
an appropriate authorization scope. We introduce a typing discipline that ensures that processes never reduce to
authorization errors, including when parties dynamically acquire authorizations.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Context
Distributed systems operation is based on cooperating remote parties that communicate with each other to
coordinate their local actions. In order to complete the tasks they were designed to perform, it is crucial that
such interacting parties followwell-defined interaction protocols, as otherwise message contents may be confused
and/or systems may get stuck. Furthermore, for the sake of accountability, it is often important to know who
are the parties or, more generically, which are the roles involved in the interactions. This identification of roles
also seems crucial when reasoning about security policies, as such policies are typically expressed in terms of the
capabilities of the involved parties.
Different notions of role-based specifications canbe found inmoderndistributed information systems, ranging
fromaccess control to structured interactions in communication-centered systems. These notions sometimes build
on the assumption that distinct participants (e.g., users at different physical locations) may belong to the same
role, and that a single participant may implement several different roles. The fact that roles may be distributed
among parties seems particularly relevant, for instance, in scenarios where several worker threads may be able to
impersonate a single server role in order to make load balancing transparent to a client service. Similarly, the fact
that a single peer can carry out actions associated to different roles seems essential to implement, e.g., a service
broker that interacts as a client with other providers while it acts as a provider with clients. Each role may be
associated with a set of permissions (e.g., privileges to access data or perform some action), thus enforcing an
assignment of permissions to involved participants.
In this work, we address the issue of dynamic role authorizations in multiparty interactions from the perspec-
tive of formal models of communication equipped with behavioral types [HLV+16].We introduce a simple process
model of communicating systems in which roles and role communication are first-class constructs so as to allow
to specify authorization handling in a dedicated way. We equip our model with a type system that ensures that
processes faithfully implement multiparty communication protocols, but also that actions of well-typed systems
conform to declared role authorizations.
In more detail, we consider communication-centered systems where interaction is governed by roles in the
above sense, that is, a role may be carried out by several peers and a single peer may carry out actions on behalf of
different roles. Building upon a minimal extension of the π -calculus [SW01], we explore this notion in a setting
where interaction is defined by actions performed on communication channels (as usual), but inwhich each action
is associated to a specific role. We then consider that using a communication channel under a specific role is the
basic communication capability.
In the model that we propose here, it is essential to ensure that communication capabilities are carried out
by parties that are actually granted to do so. This is particularly important when considering that access to
channels may be dynamically acquired, and that roles may be flexibly implemented in the system. In order to
control resource usage, we introduce authorizations at the level of first-class language primitives: this enables us
to explicitly specify which parts of the system are authorized to manipulate a (communication) resource and to
identify as errors those systems inwhich (active) communication actions are not duly authorized.Given the system
specification language, our typing system ensures, on the one hand, that parties follow well-defined protocols of
interaction and, on the other hand, that active communication actions are always properly authorized. Next, we
motivate our development on top of role-based interacting systems so as to capture and control authorizations
for communication capabilities.
1.2. Motivation
We motivate our development by discussing the underlying principles, using illustrative examples. We focus our
discussion on features added for the sake of authorization handling and do not further motivate here our base
model. In particular, given our intent to model and discipline multiparty interaction, message tags are necessary
to ensure linear interaction on a communication medium shared by multiple parties (see [CV10]). Also, for the
purpose of (flexibly) handling role-based protocol specifications, we associate roles to communication actions and
(for now) do not address scenarios where rolesmay be dynamically acquired via communications (see [BCVV12]).
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Resources in a communication-centered setting. We focus on communication-centered systems where the notion
of resource is related to communication capabilities. Let a and r denote a channel and a role, respectively. Given
our interest in role-based communication protocols carried out in channels, we identify the pair channel-role,
denoted by (a, r), as the basic resource associated to the capability of communicating along a under role r. For
instance, we write (chat,alice) to refer to the capability of sending or receiving messages along channel chat
under role alice.
Authorization domain. An authorization to act upon a resource may be described in a natural way by identifying
the part(s) of a system in which the authorization holds (or is valid at a given time), hence in which the resource
may be used. We thus specify authorizations by specifying their scope and the resource to which they refer. Since
in our setting resources are channel-role pairs, we specify this notion linguistically via a scoping operator: we
write (a, r)P to denote that (sub)system P is authorized to act as r in channel a. For example, we may write
(chat,alice)P | (chat,bob)Q to capture an (authorized) interaction along channel chat between processes
P and Q , which may act as roles alice and bob, respectively. This allows us to distinguish the authorization
from the resource itself: knowing (or discovering) the identities of channels and roles does not directly convey
the authorization to use them. Notice that in (a, r)P neither a nor r are bound, differently from other scoping
operators, such as channel restriction (νa)P .
Under this understanding of authorization scope, we may interpret process (a, r)(P | Q) as a system in which
both P and Q are authorized on the pair (a, r) and, given the similarity of the informal readings, we expect such
a specification to be equivalent to (a, r)P | (a, r)Q—the formal meaning of this equivalence shall be made clear
later on. We may thus represent, for example, a pool of threads where each one is authorized to act on a given
channel role pair—consider, e.g., a service provider that for the sake of responsiveness has several copies of the
service, all of them authorized to act on behalf of the service provider.
Dynamic authorization creation. We uniformly integrate authorization scopes in our process specification lan-
guage. This allows us to model top-level authorizations but also to specify authorization scopes at any other level
of systems or subsystems, for instance at the level of the individual branches of a parallel composition or at the
level of the continuation of a communication action. Hence, by σ.(a, r)P we represent a system that is willing to
perform action σ , and then evolve to a system that is authorized on (a, r)—which we may call dynamic autho-
rization scope creation. This seems the most sensible choice once we consider dynamic channel name creation
(via name restriction), for which there must be a means to specify the respective authorizations—consider, e.g.,
the system σ.(νa)(a, r)P where after performing α a new name a is created, and an authorization scope (a, r) is
specified.
Channel passing. In an authorization-free setting all channel-role pairs are authorized by default; the ability to
dynamically create authorizations may be also useful to enhance this usual setting. This may be important to
describe “public” interactions or, more interestingly, role-based authorizations: for instance, a client willing to
interact with a service provider may be authorized to do so a priori in some public channel but also in some
private channel. As an example, in our model we can specify the system
(service, client)serviceclient?req(x ).(x , client)P
Intuitively, prefix serviceclient?req(x ) denotes the reception of a channel (x ) in message tag req, along channel
service with role client. In the above process, this prefix is followed by an authorization to interact as client
in the received channel x . The outermost authorization scope therefore directly concerns the reception along
service. Notice that regardless of the identity of the channel received in the message the (sub)system in scope of
the authorization (P ) is authorized to interact on such a channel under role client.
Authorization communication. Statically specifying authorizations does not suffice in general, and we are inter-
ested in controlling authorizations in a more fine-grained way. Namely, we might not want to specify that a given
role is authorized for any possible received channel. In cases in which statically prescribing authorizations is
inconvenient, it is crucial to have a mechanism to communicate authorizations to other parties. Consider, e.g.,
when a server delegates a task to a worker thread, which may need to impersonate the server for carrying out
its task: the server should be able to pass along the authorization for its role in a specific channel. To this end,
we introduce primitives for communicating authorizations: given a channel a, a message tag l , and roles r and
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s, prefixes for sending and receiving authorizations will be denoted asl〈s〉 and arl (s), respectively. As explained
next, the communication of a role r will represent the transfer of the authorization to act as r.
We distinguish authorization communication from usual channel passing much like we distinguish an autho-
rization from the resource itself, hence passing along an identity does not imply passing along the authorization.
This allows us to specify scenarios where the name passing infrastructure may include unverified parties through
which channel identitiesmay be passed along, butwhere such parties do not gain authorization to use the channels
—see the broker in the motivating example below.
In our target setting, systems are specified by considering that roles are statically determined, i.e., there is no
dynamic role discovery. As such, communicating the authorization to act on behalf of a role does not involve
communicating the identity of the role, and a party willing to receive an authorization on a given role must
already know its identity. Hence, when we write, e.g., serviceworkerauth(server).P to specify the reception (by
a worker) of an authorization to act as server, this role is already determined: this prefix represents an explicit
authorization request to act as server. This is different from the name reception prefix, since the object of
an authorization reception prefix is not a binder. We write servicemasterauth〈server〉.P to specify the (dual)
emission (by a master) of an authorization to act as server. In order to send an authorization we view as a
necessary condition that the emitting party possesses the communicated authorization.
Authorization delegation. We view authorizations as a resource that should be accountable in some way, rather
than as an unrestricted (unlimited) resource. For this purpose, we introduce a notion of delegation associated to
authorization communication, in order to represent transference of (accountable) resources. Thus, whenever an
authorization is communicated the emitting party loses it. In such a way we introduce a notion of authorization
accounting in our model, since, intuitively, we may distinguish between P1  (a, r)Q and P2  (a, r)(a, r)Q : in-
deed, whileP2 may potentially delegate the authorization twice,P1 may do it only once.However, since we address
concurrent systems that share authorizations, we associate the delegation directly to the “thread” performing
the authorization communication. This way, for instance, if a process P is willing to delegate the authorization
on (a, r) such a delegation action will not interfere with process Q if both P and Q share the authorization
(regardless if we write the system as (a, r)P | (a, r)Q or (a, r)(P | Q)).
1.3. Motivating example
We now illustrate the novel constructs of our model in a concrete example. Consider a system where a client
wishes to establish an (authorized) interaction with a service provider, mediated by a broker which is involved
in the channel passing but is not authorized to interact through it. We also consider that the service provider
outsources a specific task to a third-party provider. We may write
Client | Broker | (νchat)(chat, server)Provider | Other Provider
where the channel used in the interaction between client and server (chat) is originally held by the service provider,
which also has an authorization to interact in the channel as role server. We write
Provider  (service, server)serviceserver!of f er (chat).chatserver!hello().P
to say that the provider is willing to share channel chat in message of f er (using the authorized serviceserver),
after which sending a greeting message (hello) in channel chat , role server. This will allow name chat to be
shared with others that might then receive the greeting message. As for the broker, we write
Broker  (service,broker)(brokerservice,broker)servicebroker?of f er (x ).brokerservicebroker!of f er (x )
so as to implement a forwarding behavior (essentially it receives a channel from the server and forwards in a
different channel to the client). Notice that the broker is not authorized to interact in the received channel x , even
if it will get to know its identity. We may then specify the client
Client  (brokerservice, client)brokerserviceclient?of f er (x ).(x, client)x client?hello().Q
which, differently from the broker, includes an authorization to act (as role client) in the received channel. Then,
according to the operational semantics of our model, we will have that the whole system above evolves in one
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step to
Client
| (νchat)((service,broker)(brokerservice,broker)brokerservicebroker!of f er (chat)
| (chat, server)(service, server)chatserver!hello().P )
| Other Provider
where chat is communicated from the provider to the broker, and in another step to
(νchat)((brokerservice, client)(chat, client)chatclient?hello().Q
| (chat, server)(service, server)chatserver!hello().P )
| Other Provider
where chat is communicated from the broker to the client (we omit the broker at this point since its contribution
to the interaction has finished). Notice the authorization the client specified for the received name now specifies
the chat channel, so the interaction in chat can take place leading to
(νchat)((brokerservice, client)(chat, client)Q
| (chat, server)(service, server)P )
| Other Provider
At this point let us consider that the provider wishes to delegate a task to the third party provider which involves
impersonating server in the chat conversation. We may then specify
P  serviceserver!delegate(chat).(chat,master)chatmasterauth〈server〉.P ′
and
Other Provider  (service, slave)serviceslave?delegate(y).(y, slave)yslaveauth(server).yserver! f inali ze()
where, apart from the channel passing there is also a step that involves authorization communication. In order to
impersonate server in channel chat , the third party provider first receives the channel (instantiating y) and after
which receives an authorization in the respective channel (message auth), which then allows for an authorized
interaction in the received channel, acting as server, sending message f inali ze. Notice that while the third party
provider receives the authorization, the continuation process P ′ on the original service provider side loses the
communicated authorization.
1.4. Structure of the paper
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we define our process language and further illustrate
the intended model of dynamic role authorization. The language is endowed with two operational semantics, a
reduction semantics and a Labeled Transition System (LTS), which are shown to coincide. Section 3 presents
the type system and the properties for well-typed processes. In Sect. 4, we comment on related works. Finally,
Sect. 5 draws some concluding remarks and discusses open problems. Omitted proofs have been collected in the
Appendix.
This paper offers a unified presentation of two papers: [GJP+14] and [GJP+15]. While the paper [GJP+14]
already considered dynamic role authorization in the setting of conversation types, the paper [GJP+15] introduced
the idea of authorization scopes to control and give a spatial meaning to explicit authorizations on process actions
which inspires the work presented in this document. As such, the papers [GJP+14] and [GJP+15] offer orthogonal
perspectives to the issue of dynamic role authorization with delegation; the current paper combines these two
perspectives in a uniform way. In this presentation, we have added a Labeled Transition System supporting
authorization (not present in [GJP+14, GJP+15]), together with a preliminary investigation on its associated
behavioral theory, and have extended the type system (based on conversation types) in order to account for
explicit role authorization and authorization scopes.
2. Process language
In this sectionwepresent our process language for dynamic role authorization.Our language arises as an extension
of the π -calculus, and is endowed with a reduction semantics and a labeled transition system (LTS).
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Table 1. Syntax of processes
P ::= 0 (Inaction) σ ::= as!l(b) (Output)
| P | P (Parallel) | ar?l(x ) (Input)
| (νa)P (Restriction) | asl〈d〉 (Send authorization)
| (a, r)P (Authorization scope) | arl(d) (Receive authorization)
| σ.P (Prefix)
Table 2. Structural congruence
(sc-alpha) P ≡α Q ⇒ P ≡ Q (sc-auth-inact) (a, r)0 ≡ 0
(sc-par-id) P | 0 ≡ P (sc-auth-swap) (a, r)(b, s)P ≡ (b, s)(a, r)P
(sc-par-comm) P | Q ≡ Q | P (sc-auth-dist) (a, r)(P | Q) ≡ (a, r)P | (a, r)Q
(sc-par-assoc) (P | Q) | R ≡ P | (Q | R) (sc-auth-scope) (a, r)(νb)P ≡ (νb)(a, r)P if a  b
(sc-rest-inact) (νa)0 ≡ 0
(sc-rest-extr) P | (νa)Q ≡ (νa)(P | Q) if a ∈ fn(P )
(sc-rest-comm) (νa)(νb)P ≡ (νb)(νa)P
2.1. Syntax
We consider a synchronous π -calculus [SW01] extended with tagged communications and prefixes for authoriza-
tion sending and receiving. Let L,R, and N be infinite base sets of tags, roles, and channels, respectively. We use
l , l ′, . . . to range over L; r, s,d, t . . . to range over R; and a, b, c, . . . to range over N .
The syntaxof processes is given inTable 1. It includes standard constructs for inaction (0), parallel composition
(P | Q), and name restriction ((νa)P ).Wewrite (ν
a) as a shorthand for (νa1) · · · (νan ).To specify communication
of channels and authorizations, our language includes four kinds of prefixes, denoted σ . Each prefix is associated
to a role r: intuitively, this says that σ is allowed to perform its associated action under r. The intuitive semantics
for prefixes follows:
– as!l (b) expresses sending of name b, in a message with tag l , along channel a, under role s;
– ar?l (b) expresses receiving of name b, in a message with tag l , along channel a, under role r.
These two prefixes are taken from [BCVV12]. The second pair of prefixes is new to our calculus and concerns the
communication of an authorization to act on a role:
– asl〈d〉 expresses sending authorization for role d, in a message with tag l , along channel a, under role s;
– arl (d) expresses receiving authorization for role d, in a message with tag l , along channel a, under role r.
In addition to these new prefixes, we introduce a new scoping construct:
– (a, r)P specifies the scope of authorizations: it authorizes all actions on channel a in P to act according to
role r (up to delegation).
The set of free names of these novel constructs for authorization manipulation is defined as follows:
fn((a, r)P )  fn(arl (d)P )  fn(arl〈d〉P )  fn(P ) ∪ {a}.
2.2. Reduction semantics
The process semantics is defined via a reduction relation, which is defined in Table 3 and denoted →. Reduction
is closed under static contexts and structural congruence, denoted ≡, defined in Table 2 following standard lines
(cf. [SW01]). Apart from the standard identities for the static fragment of the π -calculus (cf. Table 2, left column),
structural congruence gives basic principles for the novel authorization scope (cf. Table 2, right column):
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Table 3. Reduction relation. δ abbreviates a sequence of authorization scopes (a1, r1) · · · (ak , rk )
(comm)
δ1 (b, s)bs!l(c).P | δ2 (b, r)br?l(x ).Q → δ1 (b, s)P | δ2 (b, r)Q{c/x }
(auth)
δ1 (b, s)(b,d)bsl〈d〉.P | δ2 (b, r)brl(d).Q → δ1 (b, s)P | δ2 (b, r)(b,d)Q
(parc)
P → Q





P ≡ P ′ → Q ′ ≡ Q
P → Q
(1) authorizations can be discarded/created only for the inactive process (sc-auth-inact);
(2) authorizations can be swapped around (sc-auth-swap);
(3) authorizations distributes over parallel composition (sc-auth-dist); and
(4) authorizations and name restrictions can be swapped if the corresponding names differ (sc-auth-scope).
We remark that, differently from name restrictions, authorization scopes can neither be extruded/confined: since
authorizations are specified for free names (that cannot be α-converted), extruding/confining authorizations
actually changes the meaning of processes. For example, we have
as!l1(b).0 | (a, s) 0 ≡ (a, s)(as!l1(b).0 | 0)
because both parallel branches of the right-hand side process are authorized to interact on a (role s), while one of
the parallel branches of the left-hand side process is not (we return to this issue in Example 3). Another distinctive
property comes from the significance of multiplicity of authorization scopes. We do not adopt
(a, r)P ≡ (a, r)(a, r)P for P  0, (1)
for the sake of authorization accounting. Before presenting the operational semantics of the language, we ensure
that the rewriting supported by structural congruence is enough to isolate top-level communication actions
together with their respective authorization scopes.We require some extra notation: we write δ as an abbreviation
of a sequence of authorization scopes (a1, r1) · · · (ak , rk ). This way, a process (a1, r1) · · · (ak , rk )P can be simply
written as δ P . With a slight abuse of notation, we write (aj , rj ) ∈ δ if the scope (aj , rj ) is included in δ.
Proposition 1 (Normal form) For any process Q , there are P1, . . . , Pk , σ1, . . . , σk , 
c, and δ1, . . . , δk , where (ν
c)
and δi for i ∈ 1, . . . , k can be empty sequences, such that
Q ≡ (ν
c)(δ1 σ1.P1 | δ2 σ2.P2 | . . . | δk σk .Pk ) (2)
Proof (by induction on the structure of Q). 
Wenowdescribe the reduction rules inTable 3.Rules (comm) and (auth) specify synchronizations: twoprocesses
can exchange a message l on a channel b under roles s and r, only if they are authorized for the specified roles on
the channel b. Using Rule (auth), a process can authorize another process to act under a role (d) only if the first
process has permission to do such an authorization (it is in the scope of (b,d)) and the second process is asking
for explicit authorization of the same role (d). As the considered role will be unauthorized in the continuation of
the sender process, we consider this interaction as a kind of authorization delegation. Rules (parc), (newc), (stru)
are standard and/or self-explanatory.
We use →∗ to denote the reflexive and transitive closure of → . We introduce some auxiliary notions in order
to syntactically characterize authorization errors in our setting. First of all, we define the usual notion of active
contexts for our calculus:
Definition 1 (Active context) C[·] :: · | P | C[·] | (νa)C[·] | (a, r)C[·]
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Active contexts allow us to talk about any active communication prefixes of a process. Also, wemay introduce
a predicate that states that an active context authorizes actions on a given channel. More precisely, for a given
context and a channel-role pair, when the hole of the context is filledwith an action on the channel, it is authorized
for that action.
Definition 2 (Context authorization) For an active context C[·] and a pair (a, r), the context authorization predi-
cate, denoted auth(C[·], (a, r)), is defined inductively on the structure of C[·] as




f alse if C[·]  ·
true if C[·]  (a, r)C ′[·]
auth(C ′[·], (a, r)) if C[·]  (b, s)C ′[·] and a  b or r  s
auth(C ′[·], (a, r)) if C[·]  P | C ′[·]
auth(C ′[·], (a, r)) if C[·]  (νb)C ′[·]
Wemay then use active contexts and context authorization to precisely characterize errors in our model, since
active contexts allow us to talk about any communication prefix in the process and the context authorization pred-
icate allows to account for the authorizations granted by the context: processes that have active communication
prefixes which are not authorized are errors:
Definition 3 (Error) We say process P is an error if P ≡ C[σ(a,r).Q ] where
1. auth(C[·], (a, r))  f alse or
2. σ(a,r)  arl〈d〉 and auth(C[·], (a,d))  f alse.
We write σ(a,r) to denote a communication prefix on channel a under role r, so essentially any communication
action that may cause a stuck configuration according to our semantics (where synchronizations only occur when
processes hold the proper authorizations) is seen as an error.
We illustrate the reduction relation and our notion of error by means of a sequence of examples:
Example 1 We show two processes that are authorized for all their actions and that safely reduce to 0.
P  (a, r)(b, s)ar?l (x ).xs!l1(a).0 | (a, s)(b, r)as!l (b).br?l1(x ).0
→ (a, r)(b, s)bs!l1(a).0 | (a, s)(b, r)br?l1(x ).0 → (a, r)(b, s)0 | (a, s)(b, r)0 ≡ 0
Q  (b, s)(a,d)bs!l (a).asl1〈d〉.0 | (b, r)br?l (x ).(x , r)xrl1(d ).0
→ (b, s)(a,d)asl1〈d〉.0 | (b, r)(a, r)arl1(d ).0 → (b, s)0 | (b, r)(a, r)(a,d)0 ≡ 0
Example 2 We can go back now to the property (1) and consider processes
P  (a, s)(a, r)(a, r)asl〈r〉.ar!l1(b).0 | (a, t)atl (r).ar?l1(x ).0 and
Q  (a, s)(a, r)asl〈r〉.ar!l1(b).0 | (a, t)atl (r).ar?l1(x ).0.
Process P is well behaved, since
P → (a, s)(a, r)ar!l1(b).0 | (a, t)(a, r)ar?l1(x ).0 → (a, s)(a, r)0 | (a, t)(a, r)0 ≡ 0,
while Q gets into an error
Q → (a, s)ar!l1(b).0 | (a, t)(a, r)ar?l1(x ).0 ≡ C[ar!l1(b).0],
where C[·]  (a, s)· | (a, t)(a, r)ar?l1(x ).0 and auth(C[·], (a, r))  f alse.
Example 3 Regarding authorization extrusion/confinement consider the following processes
P  (b, r)br?l (x ).xs!l1(b).0 | (a, s)(b, s)bs!l (a).0
Q  (a, s)((b, r)br?l (x ).xs!l1(b).0 | (b, s)bs!l (a).0)
where P differs from Q by an extrusion of authorization (a, s) (or, conversely, confinement). We have that P
reduces to an error while Q does not:
P → (b, r)as!l1(b).0 | (a, s)(b, s)0
Q → (a, s)((b, r)as!l1(b).0 | (b, s)0)
This example shows that authorization extrusion is not sound in our model even when considering an expected
side condition on the extruded name (notice a does not occur free in the left-hand side of P ).
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2.3. Labeled transition system (LTS)
We now introduce a labeled transition system (LTS) for our language. Our LTS extends the (early) LTS for the
π -calculus by considering a syntax for labels with explicit annotations and rules for representing authorization
scopes. Before formally giving the LTS, we describe some intuitions. Consider the following set of labels:
λ :: as!l (b) | ar?l (b) | asl〈d〉 | arl (d) | (νa)bs!l (a) | τ
An LTS based on labels λ would be able to describe process evolution in terms of name output and input,
delegation and reception of authorization, name extrusions, and the internal action τ . However, it would not
allow us to describe the authorization scope under which any of these actions may take place, nor the fact that
senders may lose authorization through communication. To this end, we define two modifications:
(a) We annotate labels λ with authorization scopes of the form (a, t), describing that any action along channel
a is authorized on role t. As such, we will consider labels of the form
(a, t)i λ
where λ is as above and the superscript i ∈ {0, 1} in (a, t)i denotes the number of occurrences of (a, t). As a
convention, we will identify (a, t)0 λ with λ, for any not yet authorized action λ.
(b) We distinguish two kinds of internal actions, denoted τω and τ (a,d)ω , where ω stands for zero, one, or two pairs
of names and roles. Intuitively, a pair (a, r) included in the ω of τω says that such an internal action depends
on an action along name a which still requires authorization for role r. This way, for example, ω will become
invisible if the two actions leading to the synchronization are both properly authorized. The pair (a,d) in label
τ (a,d)ω states that this internal action was performed by communicating (delegating) the authorization for not
yet authorized role d along a. Once again, it is worth noticing that when an invisible action results from the
synchronization of dual actions on authorized roles, we will have label τ . When considering closed processes,
only the internal action relation τ−→ agrees with reduction, up to structural congruence (see Sect. 2.4).
Based on the above intuitions, we may now introduce the set of labels for our LTS, ranged over α, α′, . . .. We
have:
α :: (a, s)ias!l (b) | (a, r)iar?l (b) | (a, s)i (a,d)jasl〈d〉 | (a, r)iarl (d) | (νa)(b, s)ibs!l (a) | τω | τ (a,d)ω
where ω :: (a, s)i (a, r)j , with i , j ∈ {0, 1}. Given a label α, we write n(α) and bn(α) to denote its associated sets
of names and bound names, respectively. These sets are defined as expected.
Let P denote the set of all processes. We define the relation α−→⊆ P × P , for every action α. As a key novelty,
we require a set of rules to govern authorization scopes, including authorization delegation which may or may
not involve losing the communicated authorization. The transition relation is inductively defined by the following
five groups of rules, denoted (I)–(V):












1. Rule (lout) expresses that process as!l (b).P can send b (in a message with tag l ), along a under role s, and
evolve to P .
2. Using Rule (lout-a), process asl〈d〉.P can send authorization d over a under the role s, and evolve to P .
This ability is enabled for roles d and s.
3. By Rule (lin), process ar?l (x ).P is able to receive b along a, under role r, and evolve to P{b/x }.
4. By Rule (lin-a), process arl (d).P can get authorization for d along a and evolve to (a,d)P .
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(II) Similarly as in theπ -calculus,wehaveRules (lres1) and (lres2),here not dependingon includedauthorization
scopes.
(lres1)




(b,s)i bs!l(a)−−−−−−−→ Q i ∈ {0, 1} a  b
(νa)P
(νa)(b,s)i bs!l(a)−−−−−−−−−→ Q
(III) The observable behavior of a process within an authorization scope is governed byRules (lscope1) – (lscope5).
(lscope1)

























In Rule (lscope1) we use an auxiliary function that gives authorization to the pair (a, t) in the label α. It is
formalized by the authorization function, (a, t) · α, defined as follows:
α λ(a,t) τ
ω′
ω(a,t) (νb)at!l (b) (where b  a) otherwise
(a, t) · α (a, t) λ(a,t) τω′ω (νb)(a, t)at!l (b) α
where action λ is defined above and λ(a,t) denotes that the action is performed under the role t along a (i.e.
at!l (b), at?l (b), atl〈d〉 or atl (d)). These rules describe the behavior of process (a, t)P provided that P can
evolve to Q by performing action α. In three of these rules, (a, t)P loses authorization scope (a, t) after
forwarding it, and then evolves to Q .
(a) By Rule (lscope2), a process can forward authorization d under the same (once authorized) role d. For
example:
(a,d)adl〈d〉.ad!l (b)Q (a,d)adl〈d〉−−−−−−→ ad!l (b).Q .
In this way, process loses its own authorization scope.
(b) By Rule (lscope3), a process can forward authorization d under different role s. For example:
(a,d)asl〈d〉.Q (a,d)asl〈d〉−−−−−−→ Q,
(a,d)(a, s)asl〈d〉.Q (a,d)asl〈d〉−−−−−−→ (a, s)Q .
(c) By Rule (lscope5), a process can internally communicate authorized role d (see examples (3)-(5)). For
example:
(a,d)(asl〈d〉.P ′ | arl (d).Q ′) τ(a,r),(a,s)−−−−−→ P ′ | (a,d)(a,d)Q ′,
(a,d)((a, s)asl〈d〉.P ′ | arl (d).Q ′) τ(a,r)−−→ (a, s)P ′ | (a,d)(a,d)Q ′,
(a,d)((a, s)asl〈d〉.P ′ | (a, r)arl (d).Q ′) τ−→ (a, s)P ′ | (a,d)(a,d)(a, r)Q ′.
Notice that only left-hand side threads lose authorization scope (a,d), since they forward it to right-hand
side threads. As right-hand side threads were authorized to communicate role d over a, authorization
scopes (a,d) are doubled after the transitions.
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In the other two rules, (a, t)P keeps the authorization scope and evolves to (a, t)Q :
(d) By Rule (lscope4), a process having double authorization, after passing an authorization, still keeps its
copy. For example:
(a,d)(a,d)adl〈d〉.ad!l (b).Q (a,d)(a,d)adl〈d〉−−−−−−−−−−→ (a,d).ad!l (b).Q .
(e) Rule (lscope1) covers all the cases where α does not include role delegation. For example,
(b, s)bs!l (a).P ′
(b,s)bs!l(a)−−−−−−→ (b, s)P ′,
(a,d)bs!l (a).P ′
bs!l(a)−−−→ (a,d)P ′,
(a, r)(a, s)(a,d)(asl〈d〉.P ′ | arl (d).Q ′) τ−→ (a, r)(a, s)(P ′ | (a,d)(a,d)Q ′).
(IV) The four Rules (lcomm1), (lcomm2), (lauth1), and (lauth2) capture to internal actions (we omit the four
symmetric rules with commuted parallel processes in conclusions of the respective rules).
(lcomm1)
P
αω1−→ P ′ Q αω2−→ Q ′
P | Q τω1ω2−−→ P ′ | Q ′
(lcomm2)
P
(νa)(b,s)i bs!l(a)−−−−−−−−−→ P ′ Q (b,r)j br?l(a)−−−−−−−→ Q ′ ω  (b, s)1−i (b, r)1−j a ∈ fn(Q)
P | Q τω−→ (νa)(P ′ | Q ′)
(lauth1)
P
(a,s)i asl〈d〉−−−−−−→ P ′ Q (a,r)j arl(d)−−−−−−−→ Q ′ s  d ω  (a, s)1−i (a, r)1−j i ∈ {0, 1} j ∈ {0, 1}
P | Q τ
(a,d)
ω−−−→ P ′ | (a,d)Q ′
(lauth2)
P
adl〈d〉−−−→ P ′ Q (a,r)i arl(d)−−−−−−→ Q ′ ω  (a, r)1−i i ∈ {0, 1}
P | Q τ
(a,d)
(a,d)ω−−−→ P ′ | (a,d)Q ′
All four rules that describe invisible actions ((lcomm1), (lcomm2), (lauth1), (lauth2)) keep in ω and ω′of τω′ω
visible pairs that point to roles that were used in actions within corresponding invisible actions, but still
require authorization.









(a, s)i (a,d)asl〈d〉, (a, r)jarl (d)
}
,
where i ∈ {0, 1}, then we say that α1 and α2 are mutually dual actions and write α1  α2. If i  0 in (a, t)i
for some α, we write α(a,t). For example:
bs!l (a).P ′ | br?l (x ).Q ′ τ(b,s),(b,r)−−−−→ P ′ | Q ′{a/x },
(b, s)bs!l (a).P ′ | (b, r)br?l (x ).Q ′ τ−→ P ′ | Q ′{a/x },
(a,d)(a,d)adl〈d〉.P ′ | (a, r)arl (d) τ−→ (a,d)P ′ | (a,d)(a, r)Q ′;
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Rules (lauth1) and (lauth2), characteristic of our calculus, describe an internal communication of an unau-
thorized role d along a name a between processes P and Q, continuing in parallel composition P and
(a,d)Q . For example:
asl〈d〉.P ′ | arl (d ).Q ′
τ
(a,d)
(a,s),(a,r)−−−−−→ P ′ | (a,d)(a,d)Q ′, (3)
(a, s)asl〈d〉.P ′ | arl (d ).Q ′
τ
(a,d)
(a,r)−−−→ (a, s)P ′ | (a,d)(a,d)Q ′, (4)
(a, s)asl〈d〉.P ′ | (a, r)arl (d ).Q ′ τ
(a,d)−−−→ (a, s)P ′ | (a,d)(a,d)(a, r)Q ′, (5)
(V) Finally, there are three rules (and three symmetric rules) that describe parallel composition contexts —
Rules (lpar1), (lpar2), and (lpar3)).
(lpar1)
P α−→ Q bn(α) ∈ fn(R) α ∈ {asl〈d〉, (a, s)asl〈d〉, τ (a,d)ω }
P | R α−→ Q | R
(lpar2)
P
(a,s)i asl〈d〉−−−−−−→ Q i ∈ {0, 1}






P | R τ
(a,d)
ω−−−→ Q | (a,d)R
One should notice that not all transitions seamlessly cross parallel composition. By (lpar2) and (lpar3), in
case a process can delegate not yet authorized role or communicate it within an internal action, then all
processes in parallel get the authorization scope. For example:
(a, s)asl〈d〉.P ′ | (a, r)arl(d).Q ′ | ad!l(b).R′ τ
(a,d)−−−→ (a, s)P ′ | (a,d)(a,d)(a, r)Q ′ | (a,d)ad!l(b).R′.
After closing the parallel composition with the same authorization scope, the process delegating the role
will lose it and all others will keep it.
(a,d)((a, s)asl〈d〉.P ′ | (a, r)arl (d).Q ′ | ad!l (b).R′) τ−→ (a, s)P ′ | (a,d)(a,d)(a, r)Q ′ | (a,d)ad!l (b).R′.
It is in a sense analogous to open and close rules for name scoping, but having in mind that we do not have
authorization scope extrusion in the structural congruence (Table 2). Moreover, this treatment conveniently
endows processes (a, r)(P | Q) and (a, r)P | (a, r)Q with the same behavior. For example,
(a,d)(arl〈d〉.P | Q) (a,d)arl〈d〉−−−−−−→ P | (a,d)Q,
(a,d)(arl〈d〉.P ) | (a,d)Q (a,d)arl〈d〉−−−−−−→ P | (a,d)Q .
2.4. Properties
Having introduced reduction andLTS semantics for our processmodel, inwhat followsweprove their equivalence.
We need some auxiliary results:
Lemma 1 Let P and Q be processes and i ∈ {0, 1}.
(i) If P
(b,s)i bs!l(c)−−−−−−→ Q, then P ≡ (ν
a1)(δ(b, s)ibs!l (c).P ′ | R) and Q ≡ (ν
a1)(δ(b, s)iP ′ | R);
(ii) If P
(νc)(b,s)i bs!l(c)−−−−−−−−−→ Q, then P ≡ (ν
a1)(νc)(δ(b, s)ibs!l (c).P ′ | R) and Q ≡ (ν
a1)(δ(b, s)iP ′ | R);
(iii) If P
(b,s)i (b,d)i bsl〈d〉−−−−−−−−−−→ Q, then P ≡ (ν
a1)(δ(b, s)i (b,d)ibsl〈d〉.P ′ | R) and Q ≡ (ν
a1)(δ(b, s)i .P ′ | R);
(iv) If P
(b,r)i br?l(c)−−−−−−−→ Q, then P ≡ (ν
a1)(δ(b, r)ibr?l (x ).P ′ | R) and Q ≡ (ν
a1)(δ(b, r)iP ′{c/x } | R);
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(v) If P
(b,r)i brl(d)−−−−−−→ Q, then P ≡ (ν
a1)(δ(b, r)ibrl (d).P ′ | R) and Q ≡ (ν
a1)(δ(b, r)i (b,d)P ′ | R);
(vi) If P τ
(a,d)−−−→ Q then P ≡ (ν
a1)(δ1(a, s)asl〈d〉.P ′ | δ2(a, r)arl (d ).P ′ | R) and (a,d) ∈ δ1;
(vii) If P τ−→ Q then either
– P ≡ (ν
a1)(δ1(b,d)(b, s)bsl〈d〉.P ′ | δ2(b, r)brl (d).P ′ | R) and
Q ≡ (ν
a1)(δ1(b, s).P ′ | δ2(b, r)(b,d).P ′ | R), or
– P ≡ (ν
a1)(δ1(b, s)bs!l (c).P ′ | δ2(b, r)br?l (x ).P ′ | R) and
Q ≡ (ν
a1)(δ1(b, s).P ′ | δ2(b, r)P ′{c/x } | R).
Proof By induction on the length of the derivation of P α−→ Q . 
Lemma 2 If P ≡ P ′ and P α−→ Q, then there is Q ′ such that P ′ α−→ Q ′ and Q ≡ Q ′.
Proof By induction on the length of the derivation of P ≡ P ′. 
Proposition 2 P → Q if and only if there is Q ′ such that P τ−→ Q ′ and Q ≡ Q ′.
Proof The proof is in one direction by induction on derivation of P → Q and in opposite direction by induction
on the derivation P τ−→ Q . 
An advantage of defining an LTS is that it allows us to define behavioral equivalences. We say that a symmetric
binary relation B on processes is a strong bisimulation if
(P ,Q) ∈ B and P α−→ P ′ and bn(α) ∩ fn(Q)  ∅ imply Q α−→ Q ′ and (P ′,Q ′) ∈ B, for some Q ′.
The largest strong bisimulation, the strong bisimilarity, is denoted by ∼ .
Proposition 3 If P ≡ Q then P ∼ Q .
We may now state congruence of strong bisimilarity with respect to active contexts:
Proposition 4 If P ∼ Q then C[P ] ∼ C[Q ].
Proposition 4 attests that active contexts are proper functions of behavior: no two equivalent behaviors placed
in an active context yield different (image) behaviors.
As part of the proof of Proposition 3 we prove (a, r)(P | Q) ∼ (a, r)P | (a, r)Q which serves as a behav-
ioral validation of the authorization distribution law (cf. Table 2). We may also show that there is P such that
(a, r)(a, r)P ∼ (a, r)P (consider P may delegate the authorization twice) so as to witness our authorization
accounting principle. We may also show that (a, r)σ.P ∼ σ.(a, r)P , for any P , provided that prefix σ does not
involve channel a or role r. In fact, since roles are statically prescribed we may show that (a, r)P ∼ P when role
r does not occur in process P .
The behavioral equivalence, defined using the labeled transition system, serves as a proof method to show
such behavioral (in)equalities, so as to further validate our design principles and inform on the behavioral model.
3. Type system
We now introduce a behavioral type system for our language. It ensures that well-typed processes are not (autho-
rization) errors, in the sense of Definition 3 (Proposition 5). In turn, this property entails a natural form of type
safety (Corollary 1).
Our type discipline builds on the conversation types language as presented in [BCVV12]: we extend message
type M with the role r, so that we may capture role authorization passing. This is a rather natural extension,
formally given by the syntax in Table 4. Behavioral types B include:
– end, which describes inaction;
– B | B , which allows to describe concurrent independent behavior;
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Table 4. Conversation types
B ::= end (Inaction type) M ::= B | T | r (Message types)
| B | B (Parallel type) T ::= l(B) (Shared channel types)
|  B (Sometime type) p ::= !r | ?r | (r → r) : (Actions)
| p l(M ).B (Action type)
Table 5. Subtyping relation.
B1 <: B ′1
B1 | B2 <: B ′1 | B2
B <: B ′
pl(M ).B <: pl(M ).B ′
 B
B <: B
(B1 | B2) | B3 ≡ B1 | (B2 | B3) B1 | B2 ≡ B2 | B1 B | end ≡ B
(B1 | B2) ≡ B1 | B2 end ≡ end
– the sometime type B , which says that behavior B may take place immediately or later on;
– pl (M ).B , which describes a communication action identifying the role(s) involved, and whether the action is
an input ?r or an output !r or a message exchange (r → r) :, a carried message type M and the behavior B
that is prescribed to take place after the communication action.
We use behavioral types to specify the interactions in linear channels, where no communication races are
allowed (which is to say that at any given moment, there can only be one matching pair of input/output actions).
In our setting, where several parties may simultaneously use a channel, this linear communication pairing is
ensured via message tags: at a given moment, there can be only one pair of processes able to exchange a tagged
message. For shared channels, where communication races are allowed, we ensure consistent usage (but no
structured protocol of interaction) via shared channel types T , which carry a (linear) behavioral type describing
the usage delegated in the communication.
Message type M also captures the usages delegated in communications: in case M is a behavioral type B or
a shared channel type T it describes how the receiving process uses the received channel; in case M identifies a
role r then the message type captures an authorization delegation in the specified role.
Type environments separate linear and shared channel usages: 
 associates channels with (linear) behavioral
types, given by 
 :: ∅ | 
, a : B , whereas  associates channels with shared channel types, given by
 :: ∅ | , a : T .
Typing rules rely on subtyping as well as on some auxiliary notions of apartness, well-formedness, and splitting
of types. Explanations for these notions are in order:
– The subtyping relation is given in Table 5, where we useB1 ≡ B2 iffB1 <: B2 and B2 <: B1. Apart from some
usual structural identifications and context closure, subtyping specifies that B <: B (provided the latter is
well-formed) which allows to say that a behavior B that is prescribed to take place immediately may as well
be used in a context that expects B to take place later on in the protocol.
– Type apartness is used to identify non-interfering concurrent behaviors that may be safely composed in
a linear interaction. To define type-apartness we use tg(B ) to denote the set of tags occurring in type B,
defined as expected. Two types B1 and B2 are apart, written B1#B2, if they have disjoint sets of message tags
(tg(B1) ∩ tg(B2)  ∅).
– Well-formedness of a type (Table 6) ensures that parallel behaviors are apart and that the sometime  is not
associated tomessage synchronizations— synchronizations are not allowed to take place sometime later, they
are always specified to take place at a given stage in the protocol. Also, well-formedness ensures that parallel
behaviors are independent (via apartness # that checks disjointness of message tags sets).
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Table 6. Well-formed type predicate
 end B1#B2  B1  B2 B1 | B2
 B pl(M ).end#B
 pl(M ).B
 end  B1 | B2  B1  B2 (B1 | B2)
 pl(M ).B p ∈ {!s, ?r}
 pl(M ).B
Table 7. Type Split Relation
 B
B  end ◦ B
B1  B ′1 ◦ B ′′1 B2  B ′2 ◦ B ′′2  B1 | B2
B1 | B2  B ′1 | B ′2 ◦ B ′′1 | B ′′2
(S-END,S-PAR)
B  B1 ◦ B2 {p1, p2}  {!r1, ?r2}  (r1 → r2) : l(M ).B
(r1 → r2) : l(M ).B  p1l(M ).B1 ◦ p2l(M ).B2 (S-TAU)
B1  B2 ◦ B  pl(M ).B1 pl(M ).end#B
pl(M ).B1  pl(M ).B2 ◦ B (S-BRK)
B1  B2 ◦ B  pl(M ).B1 pl(M ).end#B
pl(M ).B1  pl(M ).B2 ◦ B (S-BRKS)
B  B2 ◦ B1
B  B1 ◦ B2
B ′1  B ′2 ◦ B ′3 B1 ≡ B ′1 B2 ≡ B ′2 B3 ≡ B ′3
B1  B2 ◦ B3 (S-SYM,S-EQU)
Table 8. Reduction of B and 
.
(s → r) : l(M ).B → B
B1 → B2
B1 | B → B2 | B
B1 → B2






, a : B → 
′, a : B
B1 → B2

, a : B1 → 
, a : B2
– Type splitting given in Table 7 supports the distribution of protocol “slices” among the participants in a
conversation: we write B  B1 ◦ B2 to say that behavior B may be split in behaviors B1 and B2 so that
an overall behavior B may be distributed (e.g., in the two branches of a parallel composition). We remark
that B1 and B2 may be further split so as to single out the individual contributions of each participant in a
conversation, where decomposition is driven by the structure of the process in the typing rules. We highlight
Rule (S-TAU) that allows to distribute a synchronization in the two (dual) communication prefixes, where
one of them is prescribed to happen sometime () while the other is prescribed to take place immediately
(so as to ensure the synchronization takes place immediately). Rule (S-BRK) allows to extract a () part
of the protocol that is prescribed to happen after a prefix (provided the extracted behavior and the prefix
are independent) so that, for instance, an already active third party that will only be engaged later on in the
protocol may be initially characterized by the respective sometime behavior extracted from the later stages of
the protocol.
We lift the split relation to 
 type environments in unsurprising lines: 
, a : B  
1, a : B1 ◦ 
2, a : B2 if
B  B1 ◦ B2 and 
  
1 ◦ 
2, and also 
, a : B  
1, a : B ◦ 




typing rules we write 
1 ◦ 
2 to represent 
 (if there is such 




Moreover, behavioral type and linear type environment reduction are given in Table 8, where the former states
that a synchronized communication prefix can reduce to its continuation, including under parallel composition,
while the latter lifts the relation to environments by allowing any type in the environment to reduce, embedding
reflexivity via ∅ → ∅.
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Table 9. Typing rules
(T-end)

end;  ∅ 0 (T-auth)

;   P    \ {(a, r)}

;   (a, r)P
(T-par)

1;   P 
2;   Q

1 ◦ 
2;  ∪ P | Q
(T-snew)

; , a : l(B)  P

;   (νa)P
(T-new)

, a : B ;   P matched(B) a ∈ pr1()

;   (νa)P
(T-rolein)

 ◦ a : B ;   P ?r l(s).B <: B ′   ( \ {(a, s)}) ∪ {(a, r)}

 ◦ a : B ′;   arl(s).P
(T-roleout)

 ◦ a : B ;   P !r l(s).B <: B ′ (a, s) ∈     ∪ {(a, r), (a, s)}

 ◦ a : B ′;   arl〈s〉.P
(T-in)

 ◦ a : B , b : B ′;   P ?r l(B ′).B <: B ′′ b ∈ pr1()    ∪ {(a, r)}

 ◦ a : B ′′;   ar?l(b).P
(T-out)

 ◦ a : B ;   P !r l(B ′).B <: B ′′    ∪ {(a, r)}

 ◦ a : B ′′ ◦ b : B ′;   ar!l(b).P
(T-lsin)

 ◦ a : B ; , b : T  P ?r l(T ).B <: B ′ b ∈ pr1()    ∪ {(a, r)}

 ◦ a : B ′;   ar?l(b).P
(T-lsout)

 ◦ a : B ; , b : T  P !r l(T ).B <: B ′    ∪ {(a, r)}

 ◦ a : B ′; , b : T  ar!l(b).P
(T-sin)

, b : B ; , a : l(B)  P b ∈ pr1()    ∪ {(a, r)}

; , a : l(B)  ar?l(b).P
(T-sout)

; , a : l(B)  P    ∪ {(a, r)}

 ◦ b : B ; , a : l(B)  ar!l(b).P
A typing judgment is of the form 
;   P , where  denotes the authorization set. This is a subset of the
direct product of the set of channel names and the set of roles, i.e.,  ⊆ N ×R. The typing judgment 
;   P
states that the processP is well typed under
 and with roles from pr2() (the projection on the second element
of the pairs in ) appearing in P unauthorized on corresponding channels from pr1().
Typing rules are presented in Fig. 9. There are three rules that are specific to our model:
– (T-auth) types a process under authorization scope (a, r) with authorization set diminished by (a, r).
– (T-rolein) types authorization reception of the role s on the linear channel a, under the role r, with the
authorization set diminished by (a, s), and enlarged with (a, r).
– (T-roleout) types sending of the authorization s on linear channel a, under the role r, with the authorization
set enlarged with (a, r) and (a, s).
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Notice that in Rules (T-rolein) and (T-roleout) the typing environment in the conclusion is split in a typing of a
that specifies the reception of the authorization (up to subtyping).
All other rules are similar to the typing rules from [BCVV12], with the derivation of the novel decoration 
as follows. Rule (T-end) states that a well-typed inactive process has no unauthorized roles and only end usages of
linear channels (denoted by 
end). Rule (T-new) types a restricted linear name if it (a) has no unauthorized roles
and (b) has no unmatched communications (no output or input communication prefixes). Rule (T-snew) types
a restricted shared name, without any additional restriction on unauthorized roles. Rules (T-in), (T-out), (T-lsin),
(T-lsout), (T-sin) and (T-sout) type input and output actions under the role r, with the authorization set enlarged
with (a, r). The authorization is not performed on shared channels, implying that all actions on shared channels
in a typed process must be under the corresponding authorization scope. Rule (T-par) states that the unauthorized
pairs in a parallel composition of two processes is the union of unauthorized pairs of the two composed processes.
We say that a process P is well typed if there are 
 and  such that 
;  ∅ P .
Example 4 Consider process Other Provider from our motivating example (§1.3). Using Rules (T-auth), (T-in),
(T-rolein), and (T-out) given in the Table 9 the reader can verify that process Other Provider is well typed, written

; ∅ ∅ Other Provider
where
Other Provider  (service, slave)serviceslave?delegate(y).(y, slave)yslaveauth(server).yserver! f inali ze()
and

  service :?slave delegate(By).end ◦ y : By
with
By  ?slave auth(server).!server f inali ze().end.
Contrary, the process
Evil Provider  (service, slave)serviceslave?delegate(y).yserver!evilthing().
that attempts using the channel y under role server without receiving the authorization for this role, is not
typable.
We define the reduction relation → between behavioral types B and corresponding environments 
 by allowing
a synchronized communication prefix to reduce to its continuation (s → r) : l (M ).B → B , so as to mimic
the respective process behavior, by allowing reduction to occur in a branch of a parallel composition (e.g.,
B1 → B2 ⇒ B | B1 → B | B2), and by lifting the relation point-wise to environments, embedding reflexivity
so as to encompass process reductions involving shared or bound channels (where no reduction in the linear
usages of free names is required).
Theorem 1 (Type preservation) Let 
;   P for some 





′;   Q .
A direct consequence of type preservation is protocol fidelity: every reduction of the process corresponds to a
reduction of the types, thus ensuring that the process follows the protocols prescribed by the types. Notice that
communication safety (no type mismatches in communications) is entailed by protocol fidelity, which in our case
also attests that processes agree in the role when sending and receiving authorizations.
Proposition 5 (Error free) If P is a well-typed process, then P is not an authorization error.
Combining freedom from errors and type preservation results we immediately obtain our notion of type safety,
which ensures that well-typed processes never reach an error configuration.
Corollary 1 (Type safety) If P is a well-typed process and P →∗ Q, then Q is not an authorization error.
Our type safety result ensures every action that may eventually become active is duly authorized. Notice
that our typing characterization directly records the authorizations required by the system from the external
context. However, we may also infer the authorizations held by the system itself, by contrasting the channel usage
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(captured by the typing environment) with the required authorizations: channels that are not mentioned in the
required authorizations that have a prescribed usage must be authorized in the system. As such the behavioral
interface captured by the typing characterization can also be viewed as a system specification: provided some
authorizations, the system behavior must be compliant with the prescribed interface, possibly including actions
for which authorization is not provided.
4. Related work
From a broad, historical perspective, studies on access control and authorization go back at least to the sem-
inal work by Lampson [Lam74], who proposed the access control matrix model. Harrison, Ruzzos and Ull-
man (HRU) [HRU76] formalized this protection model as a matrix which has columns indexed by objects and
rows indexed by subjects; each entry in the matrix is a subject of a set of access models. HRU proved that it is
undecidable whether a given state of a given protection system is safe for a given generic right. Sandhu [San92]
developed the typed access matrix (TAM)model by introducing strong typing into theHRUmodel (in essence, by
assigning types to objects), and showed that strong typing usefully enables decidable safety analyses. See [SdV00]
for an introduction to access control systems and their formalization.
Fournet et al. [FGM07] consider the problem of verifying whether a distributed system correctly implements
a target authorization policy, expressed as statements and expectations. Their formal development is based on
the spi-calculus, a variant of the π -calculus with cryptographic operations. They develop a type system based on
annotations that define authorization policies: the type system checks conformance to a policy by tracking the
logical facts/rules in the typing environment, and using logical deduction to type authorization expectations.
Role-based access control in distributed systemswith dynamic access rights was handled byDezani-Ciancagli-
ni et al. [DGJP10] by means of a type system, which ensures security properties. In this calculus, roles assigned
to data can be dynamically administered, while role communication between processes was not treated. Previous
works in the setting of session calculi consider security properties like confidentiality and integrity (we refer
the interested reader to the recent overview [BCD+15]). For instance, Bonelli et al. [BCG05] extend session types
with correspondence assertions, a form of dependent types which ensures consistency of data during computation.
More recently, aspects of secure information flow and access control have been addressed for sessions in works
such as [BCCDC11, CCDC11, CCDCR10]. Denie´lou and Yoshida [DY11] use a kind of role-based approach
where communication is controlled by a previously acquired reputation. Similarly to our work, Lapadula et
al. [LPT07] consider a typed approach to role-based authorizations for service-oriented applications. Differently
from our model, assigned roles are initially authorized and communicated data carries information on roles that
will use it.
Scoping operators have been used to model security aspects; they typically rely on bound names to represent
secrets or nonces. With the aim of representing secrecy and confidentiality requirements in process specifications,
Giunti et al. [GPV12] investigate an scoping operator called hide, alternative to usual name restriction; the hide
operator is embedded in the so-called secrecy π -calculus, tailored to program secrecy in communications. The
expressiveness of the hide operator is investigated in the context of a behavioral theory, by means of a Spy agent.
In contrast, our (free name) scoping operator focuses on authorization, a different security concern.
Vivas and Yoshida [VY02] propose a scoping operator (called filter) for dynamic channel screening. In a
different setting (higher-order process communication) and with similar properties, the filter operator blocks all
the actions that are not contained in the corresponding filter (which contains polarized channel names). Contrary
to our authorization scope construct, filters are statically assigned to processes, while the authorization scope
assigned to a process may be dynamically changed.
To the best of our knowledge, the authorization scoping proposed here has not been explored before for
the specification of communication-centered systems. Our integration of the authorization scoping in the system
specification language in an uniformway is a distinguished feature of our approachwhen compared to other forms
of site-level authorization handling (see, e.g., Gorla and Pugliese’s work [GP09]). There are high-level similarities
between our work and the concept of ownership types, as well studied for object-oriented languages [CPN98].
Although in principle ownership types focus on static ownership structures, assessing their use for disciplining
dynamic authorizations is interesting future work. Also, it may also prove to be worthwhile to exploit depen-
dent/refinement types (see, e.g., [SCC10]) in our setting.
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5. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have introduced a typed process framework for specifying and reasoning about role-based
authorization. Our contribution is based on previous work on conversation types [CV10] and their extension
with dynamic assignment of roles to several parties in a concurrent system [BCVV12]. We focused on a modular
extension of the existing framework, so as to leverage on previous results, adding the minimal elements so as to
identify the specific issues at hand and set the basis for further developments.
We have addressed the problem of role authorization and communication of authorizations in an extension
of the π -calculus, where communication prefixes are annotated with role authorizations. For simplicity, we have
considered a “flat” set of roles; it is conceivable that concrete application settings may require sets of roles subject
to hierarchical orderings. The presented calculus allows for the dynamic communication of authorizations and is
equipped with an authorization scoping operator that precisely specifies the range of authorized use of particular
roles in particular channels. We then extend the conversation type system in which a well-typed process can never
reduce to an authorization error, thus (statically) ensuring that well-typed processes are always authorized to
communicate on behalf of a role, including when authorizations are dynamically passed in messages.
The analysis technique presented in this paper combines a behavioral type discipline with authorization
control. In our view, structured communication and authorization are orthogonal aspects subject to be controlled
in separate, dedicated ways. Our type structure retains the meaning of types in [CV10, BCVV12] and does
not mention authorizations, which are instead treated at the level of process specifications. This separation
between communication and authorizations leads to clear typed interfaces and simplifies analyses. Still, we
may already argue that our behavioral types pave the way for the verification of more fine-grained authorization
communication control. Indeed, our types mention explicitly the identities of the communicated roles; this allows
us to enforce further discipline just by inspecting the types. Consider, for example, the type
?r l (d).(s → t) : l (d).end
where the specification yields the information that role d is received and afterwards communicated away. When
role authorization containment is a concern, for instance since trust can be of an intransitive nature, it may be
desirable to exclude the above communication pattern under some circumstances. One possibility is to completely
exclude authorization re-communication. Alternatively we can look at the involved roles and validate according
to some trust policy defined for them.
The advantage of lifting the analysis from processes to types is that the simpler the target of the analysis is,
the simpler the analysis techniques will be. Such a verification step can be carried out statically, when nevertheless
also the system must be verified, but more interestingly, can also be carried out at runtime. If we interpret such
types as contracts to which processes will abide to, as ensured by the fidelity property, the composition of systems
at runtime may be driven by type information. For instance, one may choose to avoid using web apps that re-
communicate authorizations under the chosen circumstances. Investigating this kind of static analysis over types
is an interesting direction for the future.
The type structure presented in this paper is purposefully simple and we do not consider constructs for infinite
behavior at the level of processes nor at the level of behavioral types. Indeed, the model and examples considered
throughout the paper are finite-state, and therefore possibly amenable for analysis using alternative techniques,
such as, e.g., reachability analysis/model checking. In the presence of infinite behavior and recursive types, the
situation is different. Although recursive types are absent in [BCVV12], we find no fundamental obstacle in
extending our model with recursive types, essentially following the approach in [CV10] for conversation types.
We believe that recursion and authorization handling are orthogonal concerns; further work is required to clarify
this relationship.
Acknowledgements
We thank the anonymous referees for their insightful remarks that allowed us to greatly improve the presentation
of our work. We acknowledge support by COST Action IC1201: Behavioural Types for Reliable Large-Scale
Software Systems (BETTY) via Short-Term Scientific Mission grants (to Pantovic´ and Vieira), and by grants
ON174026 and III44006 of the Ministry of Education and Science, Serbia. Pe´rez is also affiliated to the NOVA
Laboratory for Computer Science and Informatics (NOVALINCS – PEst/UID/CEC/04516/2013), Universidade
Nova de Lisboa, Portugal.
662 S. Ghilezan et al.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and repro-
duction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a
link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
A. Proofs
A.1. Proofs from Sect. 2
Lemma 1 Let P and Q be processes and i ∈ {0, 1}.
(i) If P
(b,s)i bs!l(c)−−−−−−→ Q, then P ≡ (ν
a1)(δ(b, s)ibs!l (c).P ′ | R) and Q ≡ (ν
a1)(δ(b, s)iP ′ | R);
(ii) If P
(νc)(b,s)i bs!l(c)−−−−−−−−−→ Q, then P ≡ (ν
a1)(νc)(δ(b, s)ibs!l (c).P ′ | R) and Q ≡ (ν
a1)(δ(b, s)iP ′ | R);
(iii) If P
(b,s)i (b,d)i bsl〈d〉−−−−−−−−−−→ Q, then P ≡ (ν
a1)(δ(b, s)i (b,d)ibsl〈d〉.P ′ | R) and Q ≡ (ν
a1)(δ(b, s)i .P ′ | R);
(iv) If P
(b,r)i br?l(c)−−−−−−−→ Q, then P ≡ (ν
a1)(δ(b, r)ibr?l (x ).P ′ | R) and Q ≡ (ν
a1)(δ(b, r)iP ′{c/x } | R);
(v) If P
(b,r)i brl(d)−−−−−−→ Q, then P ≡ (ν
a1)(δ(b, r)ibrl (d).P ′ | R) and Q ≡ (ν
a1)(δ(b, r)i (b,d)P ′ | R);
(vi) If P τ
(a,d)−−−→ Q then P ≡ (ν
a1)(δ1(a, s)asl〈d〉.P ′ | δ2(a, r)arl (d ).P ′ | R) and (a,d) ∈ δ1;
(vii) If P τ−→ Q then either
– P ≡ (ν
a1)(δ1(b,d)(b, s)bsl〈d〉.P ′ | δ2(b, r)brl (d).P ′ | R) and
Q ≡ (ν
a1)(δ1(b, s).P ′ | δ2(b, r)(b,d).P ′ | R), or
– P ≡ (ν
a1)(δ1(b, s)bs!l (c).P ′ | δ2(b, r)br?l (x ).P ′ | R) and
Q ≡ (ν
a1)(δ1(b, s).P ′ | δ2(b, r)P ′{c/x } | R).
Proof The proof is by rule induction on the inference of P α−→ Q . We will highlight the following case:
(ii) Base case is obtained by rule (lres2). In that case, P  (νc)P1 and P1 (b,s)
i bs!l(c)−−−−−−→ Q . By (i) we have
P1 ≡ (ν
a1)(δ(b, s)ibs!l (c).P ′ | R) and Q ≡ (ν
a1)(δ(b, s)iP ′ | R).
and therefore, applying (sc-rest-comm), we have
P ≡ (νc)(ν
a1)(δ(b, s)ibs!l (c).P ′ | R) ≡ (ν
a1)(δ(b, s)ibs!l (c).P ′ | R).
Induction step considers the following cases of the last applied rule:
1. (lres1) : P  (νa)P1 and Q  (νa)Q1 and P1 (νc)(b,s)
i bs!l(c)−−−−−−−−−→ Q1 and a ∈ {b, c}. By induction hypothesis,
P1 ≡ (ν
a1)(νc)(δ(b, s)ibs!l (c).P ′ | R) and Q1 ≡ (ν
a1)(δ(b, s)iP ′ | R)
and therefore
P ≡ (νa)(ν
a1)(νc)(δ(b, s)ibs!l (c).P ′ | R) and Q ≡ (νa)(ν
a1)(δ(b, s)iP ′ | R).
2. (lscope1):
(a) P  (a, t)P1 and Q  (a, t)Q1 and (a, t)  (b, s) and P1 (νc)(b,s)
i bs!l(c)−−−−−−−−−→ Q1. By induction hypothesis
P1 ≡ (ν
a1)(νc)(δ(b, s)ibs!l (c).P ′ | R) Q1 ≡ (ν
a1)(δ(b, s)iP ′ | R)
and, by (sc-auth-scope), assuming a  c, a ∈ 
a1, and (sc-auth-dist), we get
P ≡ (a, t)(ν
a1)(νc)(δ(b, s)ibs!l (c).P ′ | R) ≡ (ν
a1)(νc)(a, t)(δ(b, s)ibs!l (c).P ′ | R)
≡ (ν
a1)(νc)((a, t)δ(b, s)ibs!l (c).P ′ | (a, t)R) and
Q ≡ (a, t)(ν
a1)(δ(b, s)iP ′ | R) ≡ (ν
a1)((a, t)δ(b, s)iP ′ | (a, t)R).
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(b) P  (b, s)P1 and Q  (b, s)Q1 and i  1 and P1 (νc)bs!l(c)−−−−−−→ Q1. By induction hypothesis
P1 ≡ (ν
a1)(νc)(δbs!l (c).P ′ | R) and Q1 ≡ (ν
a1)(δP ′ | R).
By (sc-auth-scope), b  c, b ∈ 
a1, and (sc-auth-dist), we get
P ≡ (b, s)(ν
a1)(νc)(δbs!l (c).P ′ | R) ≡ (ν
a1)(νc)((b, s)δbs!l (c).P ′ | (b, s)R) and
Q ≡ (b, s)(ν
a1)(δP ′ | R) ≡ (ν
a1)((b, s)δP ′ | (b, s)R).
3. (lpar1) : P  P1 | R and Q  Q1 | R and P1 (νc)(b,s)
i bs!l(c)−−−−−−−−−→ Q1 and c ∈ fn(R). By induction hypothesis
P1 ≡ (ν
a1)(νc)(δ(b, s)ibs!l (c).P ′ | R1) and Q1 ≡ (ν
a1)(δ(b, s)iP ′ | R1).
By (sc-rest-extr) and (sc-alpha), for 
a1, c ⊆ fn(R), we get
P ≡ R | (ν
a1)(νc)(δ(b, s)ibs!l (c).P ′ | R1) ≡ (ν
a1)(νc)(δ(b, s)ibs!l (c).P ′ | R1 | R) and
Q ≡ R | (ν
a1)(δ(b, s)iP ′ | R1) ≡ (ν
a1)(δ(b, s)iP ′ | R1 | R).

Lemma 2 If P ≡ P ′ and P α−→ Q, then there is Q ′ such that P ′ α−→ Q ′ and Q ≡ Q ′.
Proof The proof is by induction on the length of the derivation of P ≡ P ′. We detail only some cases:
(sc-auth-dist): Let P  (a, r)(P1 | Q1) and P ′  (a, r)P1 | (a, r)Q1. There are five possible transitions for P ,
by (lscope1) − (lscope5).
(lscope1) : Assume that (a, r)(P1 | Q1) α
(a,r)−−→ (a, r)P ′1, where for P1 | Q1 α−→ P ′1, and for i  0, 1 it holds
α  (a, s)iasl〈r〉 and α  τ (a,r)ω . For the transition P1 | Q1 α−→ P ′1, the following three cases are possible:
• (lpar1) : P1 | Q1 α−→ P ′′1 | Q1 and P1 α−→ P ′′1 and bn(α) ∈ fn(Q1). By (lscope1) we can derive (a, r)P1 α
(a,r)−−→
(a, r)P ′′1 . As bn(α) ∈ fn((a, r)Q1), by (lpar1) we have (a, r)P1 | (a, r)Q1 α
(a,r)−−→ (a, r)P ′′1 | (a, r)Q1.
• (lcomm1) : P1 | Q1 α−→ P ′′1 | Q ′1 and α  τω1ω2 and P1
αω1−→ P ′′1 and Q1
αω2−→ Q ′1. Since αω1 and αω2 does not
include unauthorized delegated roles, (a, r)P1 | (a, r)Q1
(τω1ω2 )
(a,r)
−−−−−→ (a, r)P ′′1 | (a, r)Q ′1.
• (lcomm2) : P1 | Q1 α−→ (νc)(P ′′1 | Q ′1) and α  τω and P1 α1−→ P ′′1 and Q1 α2−→ Q ′1 and {α1, α2}
 {(νc)(b, s)ibs!l (c), (b, t)j bt?l (c)} for some i , j ∈ {0, 1}. By (lscope1), (a, r)P1 α
(a,r)
1−−→ (a, r)P ′′1 and (a, r)Q1
α2
(a,r)−−−→ (a, r)Q ′1. Hence, by (lcomm2), (a, r)P1 | (a, r)Q1
(τω1ω2 )
(a,r)
−−−−−→ (νc)((a, r)P ′′1 | (a, r)Q ′1).

Lemma 3 If P → Q then there is Q ′ such that P τ−→ Q ′ and Q ≡ Q ′.
Proof By induction on the derivation P → Q .
Case (comm) δ1(b, s)bs!l (c).P | δ2(b, r)br?l (x ).Q → δ1(b, s)P | δ2(b, r)Q{c/x } :
By (lout) and (consecutive application of) (lscope1) we infer
δ1(b, s)bs!l (c).P
(b,s)bs!l(c)−−−−−−→ δ1(b, s)P ,
and by (lin) and (lscope1) we get
δ2(b, r)br?l (x ).Q
(b,r)br?l(c)−−−−−−→ δ2(b, r)Q{c/x }.
Therefore, by (lcomm1), we have
δ1(b, s)bs!l (c).P | δ2(b, r)br?l (x ).Q τ−→ δ1(b, s)P | δ2(b, r)Q{c/x }.
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Case (auth) δ1(b, s)(b,d)bsl〈d〉.P | δ2(b, r)brl (d).Q → δ1(b, s)P | δ2(b, r)(b,d)Q :
By (lout- a), (lscope2) and (lscope1), we get
δ1(b, s)(b,d)bsl〈d〉.P (b,s)(b,d)bsl〈d〉−−−−−−−−−→ δ1(b, s)P ,




δ1(b, s)(b,d)bsl〈d〉.P | δ2(b, r)brl (d).Q τ−→ δ1(b, s)P | δ2(b, r)(b,d)Q .
Case (stru) : Assume that P → Q is derived from P ≡ P ′ → Q ′ ≡ Q . By induction hypothesis, there is Q1
such that P ′ τ−→ Q1 and Q ′ ≡ Q1. By Lemma 2, there is Q2 such that P τ−→ Q2 and Q2 ≡ Q1(≡ Q ′ ≡ Q).
Case (parc): If P1 | R → Q1 | R is derived from P1 → Q1, by induction hypothesis there is Q ′1 such that
P1
τ−→ Q ′1 and Q1 ≡ Q ′1. By (lpar1), P1 | R τ−→ Q ′1 | R. Since Q1 ≡ Q ′1, by contextually of ≡, we conclude that
Q1 | R ≡ Q ′1 | R.
Case (newc) : If (νa)P1 → (νa)Q1 is derived from P1 → Q1, by induction hypothesis there is Q ′1 such that
P1
τ−→ Q ′1 and Q1 ≡ Q ′1. By (lres1), (νa)P1 τ−→ (νa)Q ′1. By contextually of ≡, from Q1 ≡ Q ′1, we have that
(νa)Q1 ≡ (νa)Q ′1. 
Lemma 4 If P τ−→ Q then there is Q ′ such that P → Q ′ and Q ≡ Q ′.
Proof By induction on the derivation P τ−→ Q . We have a case analysis on the last applied rule:
• (lcomm1) : Assume that P | Q τ−→ P ′ | Q ′ is derived from P α−→ P ′ and Q α−→ Q ′, where α ∈ {(a, s)as!l (b),
(a, r)ar?l (b)} or α ∈ {(a, s)(a,d)asl〈d〉, (a, r)arl (d)}. By Lemma 1, up to ≡,
P ,Q ∈ {(ν
a1)(δ1(a, s)as!l (b).P ′1 | R), (ν
a2)(δ2(a, r)ar?l (x ).P ′2 | R′)} or
and we get the proof by (comm), or
P ,Q ∈ {(ν
a1)(δ1(a, s)(a,d)asl〈d〉.P ′ | R), (ν
a2)(δ2(a, r)arl (d ).P ′ | R)}
and the proof is completed by (auth).
• (lcomm2) : Assume that P | Q τ−→ P ′ | Q ′ is derived from P (νa)(b,s)bs!l(a)−−−−−−−−→ P ′ and Q (b,r)br?l(a)−−−−−−→ Q ′. By
Lemma 1,
P ≡ (ν
a1)(νa)(δ1(b, s)bs!l (a).P ′1 | R) and Q ≡ (ν
a2)(δ2(b, r)br?l (x ).P ′2 | R′).
we get the proof by (sc-rest-extr) and (comm).
• (lscope5) : Assume that (a,d)P τ−→ Q is derived from P τ (a,d)−−−→ Q . By Lemma 1,
P ≡ (ν
a1)(δ1(a, s)asl〈d〉.P ′ | δ2(a, r)arl (d ).P ′ | R) and (a,d) ∈ δ1,
concluding the proof by (sc-auth-scope) and (auth).
• (lres1) : Assume that (νa)P τ−→ (νa)Q is derived from P τ−→ Q . By induction hypothesis there is Q ′ such that
P → Q ′ and Q ′ ≡ Q . We get the proof by (newc) and contextuality of ≡ .
• (lpar1) : Assume that P | R τ−→ Q | R is derived from P τ−→ Q . By induction hypothesis there is Q ′ such that
P → Q ′ and Q ′ ≡ Q . We get the proof by (parc) and contextuality of ≡ .

Proposition 2 P → Q if and only if there is Q ′ such that P τ−→ Q ′ and Q ≡ Q ′.
Proof The proof follows by Lemma 3 and 4. 
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Proposition 3 If P ≡ Q then P ∼ Q .
Proof Let us prove that ≡ ⊆ ∼.
Assume P ≡ Q and P α−→ P ′. Then by Lemma 3 there is a process Q ′ such that Q α−→ Q ′ and Q ≡ Q ′. Which
proves ≡ to be a strong bisimulation. Therefore ≡ ⊆ ∼, since ∼ is the largest strong bisimulation. 
Proposition 4 If P ∼ Q then C[P ] ∼ C[Q ].
Proof Assume that ∼c is a contextual congruence closure (relation) of ∼, i.e.
P ∼ Q then C[P ] ∼c C[Q ].
Then
∼ ⊆ ∼c
which follows by taking C[·]  ·. Also, since ∼c is a contextual closure of ∼ then P ∼c Q implies that P  C[P1],
Q  C[Q1] and P1 ∼ Q1, for some context C[·] and some processes P1 and Q1.
Let us show that ∼c is a strong bisimulation, that is
if P ∼c Q and P α−→ P ′, then there is Q ′ such that Q α−→ Q ′ and P ′ ∼c Q ′.
Assume P ∼c Q and P α−→ P ′, where P  C[P1], Q  C[Q1] and P1 ∼ Q1.
The proof is by induction on the structure of the context C[·].
• If C[·]  ·, then P  P1, Q  Q1, hence P ∼ Q and the statement holds.
• If C[·]  (a, r)C1[·], then P  (a, r)C1[P1], Q  (a, r)C1[Q1] and P1 ∼ Q1. For the transition (a, r)C1[P1] α−→
P ′ there are five possible cases: (lscope1)-(lscope5). We show only case (lscope1) : then (a, r)C1[P1] (a,r)·α−−−→
(a, r)P ′, where C1[P1] α−→ P ′. Then by the induction hypothesis C1[Q1] α−→ Q ′ and P ′ ∼c Q ′, for some Q ′. The
proof is completed by (a, r)C1[Q1] (a,r)·α−−−→ (a, r)Q ′ and (a, r)P ′ ∼c (a, r)Q ′ since ∼c is a contextual closure.
The case C[·]  R | C1[·] can be proved similarly.
• If C[·]  (νa)C1[·], then P  (νa)C1[P1], Q  (νa)C1[Q1] and P1 ∼ Q1.
For the transition (νa)C1[P1] α−→ P ′ there are two cases: (lres1) and (lres2). For (lres1) the statement follows
by the induction hypothesis. For (lres2) by Lemma 1(i) it follows that
P ≡ (ν
a1)(νc)(δ(b, s)ibs!l (c).R′ | R) and P ′ ≡ (ν
a1)(δ(b, s)iR′ | R).
The relation ∼c is a strong bisimulation, then ∼c ⊆ ∼ since ∼ is the largest bisimulation. To this end ∼c  ∼,
hence the strong bisimilarity ∼ is a congruence with respect to active contexts. 
A.2. Proofs from Sect. 3
Lemma 5 (Inversion Lemma)
1. If 




;   (νa)P , then
(a) 
; , a : l (B )  P , or
(b) 
; a : B ;   P and matched(B ) and a ∈ pr1().
3. If 
;   (a, r)P then 
,  P and    \ {(a, r)}.
4. If 
;   arl (s).P then 
  
′ ◦ a : B ′ and 
′ ◦ a : B ;   P and ?r l (s).B <: B ′ and  
( \ {(a, s)}) ∪ {(a, r)}
5. If
;   arl〈s〉.P then
  
′◦a : B ′ and
′◦a : B ;   P and !r l (s).B <: B ′ and  ∪{(a, r), (a, s)}
and (a, s) ∈ .
6. If 
;   ar?l (b).P then
(a) 
  
′ ◦a : B ′′ and 
′ ◦a : B , b : B ′;   P and ?r l (B ′).B <: B ′′ and b ∈ pr1() and   ∪{(a, r)},
or
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(b) 
  
′ ◦ a : B ′ and 
′ ◦ a : B ; ′, b : T  P and ?r l (T ).B <: B ′ and b ∈ pr1() and    ∪ {(a, r)},
or
(c)   ′, a : l (B ) and 
 ◦ b : B ;   P and b ∈ pr1() and    ∪ {(a, r)}.
7. If 
;   ar!l (b).P , then
(a) 
  
′ ◦ a : B ′′ ◦ b : B ′ and 
′ ◦ a : B ;   P and !r l (B ′).B <: B ′′ and    ∪ {(a, r)}, or
(b) 
  
′ ◦ a : B ′ and   ′, b : T and 
′ ◦ a : B ;   P and !r l (T ).B <: B ′ and    ∪ {(a, r)}.
(c) 
  
′ ◦ b : B and   ′, a : l (B ) and 
′;   P and    ∪ {(a, r)}.
8. If 
;  ′ P | Q, then 
  
1 ◦ 
2 and ′   ∪  and 
1;   P and 




Lemma 6 (Substitution lemma) Let 




′, c : B and 
′ ◦ b : B is defined then 
′ ◦ b : B ;   P{b/c}.
(b) If   ′, c : T and ′, b : T is defined then 
; ′, b : T  P{b/c}.
Lemma 7 (Subject congruence) If 
;   P and P ≡ Q then 
;   Q .
Theorem 1 (Type preservation) Let 
;   P for some 





′;   Q .
Proof The proof is by induction on the of derivation P → Q and by cases on the last rule applied. The only
interesting case is induced by (auth).
In that case P  δ1(b, s)(b,d)bsl〈d〉.P ′ | δ2(b, r)brl (d).Q ′ and Q  δ1(b, s)P ′ | δ2(b, r)(b,d)Q ′.
From Lemma 5(8) we obtain that for some 
1,





•   1 ∪ 2
(1) 
1,  1 δ1(b, s)(b,d)bsl〈d〉.P ′
(2) 
2,  2 δ2(b, r)brl (d).Q ′
From (1) and (2) and Lemma 5(3) we obtain:
(3) 
1,  ′1 bsl〈d〉.P ′ where 1  ′1 \ {δ1, (b, s), (b,d)}
(4) 
2,  ′2 brl (d).Q ′ where 2  ′2 \ {δ2, (b, r)}
From (3) and Lemma 5(5) we obtain:
• 
1  
′1 ◦ b : B1
(5) 
′1 ◦ b : B ′1;  ′′1 P ′ where ′1  ′′1 ∪ {(b, s), (b,d)}
• !s l (d).B ′1 <: B1
• (b,d) ∈ ′′1
From (4) and Lemma 5(4) we obtain:
• 
2  
′2 ◦ b : B2
(6) 
′2 ◦ b : B ′2;  ′′2 Q ′ where ′2  (′′2 \ {(b,d)}) ∪ {(b, r)}
• ?r l (d).B ′2 <: B2
From (5),(6) and (T-auth) we obtain:
• 
′1 ◦ b : B ′1;  ′′′1 δ1(b, s)P ′ where ′′′1  ′′1 \ {δ1, (b, s)}
• 
′2 ◦ b : B ′2;  ′′′2 δ2(b, r)(b, d )Q ′ where ′′′2  ′′2 \ {δ2, (b, r), (b, d )}
Finally, since one can easily derive ′′′1 ∪ ′′′2   and B1 ◦ B2 → B ′1 ◦ B ′2, from previous and (T-par) we can
conclude 




′1 ◦ b : B ′1 ◦ 
′2 ◦ b : B ′2  
′1 ◦ 
′2 ◦ b : B ′1 ◦ B ′2. 
Lemma 8 If
;  ∅ C[α(a,r).Q ] thenauth(C[·], (a, r))  true and ifα(a,r)  arl〈d〉 thenauth(C[·], (a,d))  true.
Proposition 5 If P is a well-typed process, then P is not an authorization error.
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